




















THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPOSSIBLE STAIRWAYS AND 
GREENER GRASS 
 



























ISSN 0924-7815 The possibility of impossible stairways and greener grass
Mark Voorneveld1
Dept. of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
and
Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden
Abstract. In classical game theory, players have nitely many actions and evaluate outcomes
of mixed strategies using a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Allowing a larger, but
countable, player set introduces a host of phenomena that are impossible in nite games.
Firstly, in coordination games, all players have the same preferences: switching to a weakly
dominant action makes everyone at least as well o as before. Nevertheless, there are coordina-
tion games where the best outcome occurs if everyone chooses a weakly dominated action, while
the worst outcome occurs if everyone chooses the weakly dominant action.
Secondly, the location of payo-dominant equilibria behaves capriciously: two coordination
games that look so much alike that even the consequences of unilateral deviations are the same
may nevertheless have disjoint sets of payo-dominant equilibria.
Thirdly, a large class of games has no (pure or mixed) Nash equilibria. Following the proverb
\the grass is always greener on the other side of the hedge", greener-grass games model constant
discontent: in one part of the strategy space, players would rather switch to its complement.
Once there, they'd rather switch back.
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11. Introduction
Game-theoretic models use innite player sets as a useful abstraction to model interaction
between large numbers of agents. The classical game-theoretic motivation for perfect competi-
tion and general-equilibrium analysis models players as a continuum, usually the unit interval
with the associated Borel-Lebesgue measure: individual players have no in
uence on payos.
On the other hand, it is probably easier to imagine innitely many people as a countable set.
For completeness, Section 5.2 recalls standard motivations for using countably innite player
sets. Let us, instead, get straight to the main message: Games with a countably innite set of
players allow for a host of practically relevant phenomena that cannot occur in nite games.
Basu (1994), for instance, considers coordination games | games where all players have the
same preferences | and shows that, in contrast with the nite case, dominant-strategy equilibria
need not be payo-dominant:
Claim 1. There are games where
(a) there are no con
icts of interest: all players have the same payo function,
(b) each player has a strictly dominant strategy,
(c) nevertheless, everybody is better o if no-one chooses the dominant strategy than
in the unique Nash equilibrium, where all players choose it.
This is out of the question in nite coordination games. Start with an arbitrary strategy prole
and let players not already doing so switch to the strictly dominant strategy, one at a time.
Each switch strictly increases the common payo function, so the dominant-strategy equilibrium
payo-dominates all other strategy proles. Example 1.1, simplifying that of Basu (1994, p. 5),
establishes the validity of Claim 1.
Example 1.1 Each player i 2 N has two pure strategies, 0 and 1, and payo function






j2N aj  2 j if
P
j2N aj is nite,
 2 +
P
j2N aj  2 j if
P
j2N aj is innite.
As a unilateral deviation by player i from 0 to 1 increases the payo by 2 i > 0, regardless of
the choices of the other players, action 1 strictly dominates 0. Hence, (1;1;:::) is the unique
Nash equilibrium. However, as U(1;1;:::) =  1 < 0 = U(0;0;:::), the players would have been
better o if they all had chosen 0: there is no payo-dominant Nash equilibrium. /
2As a practical application of Claim 1, think of a large society of card-carrying utilitarians
committed to the same social-welfare function. At the outbreak of an epidemic, an agent's
ability to contribute to social welfare depends on his state of health. Penicillin provides a
cure or lessens the symptoms due to malign bacteria: when facing the choice between using or
abstaining from antibiotics, using them is the dominant option. But if the use of antibiotics
becomes a rule, rather than an exception, bacteria quickly develop ways to survive them. This
disastrously decreases the power of penicillin as a weapon against microbial foes.
Basu (1994) gives a similar example involving language. Telling the occasional white lie may
well be a dominant strategy, but if lies become a routine, language ceases to have power and
meaningful communication breaks down. He refers to coordination games with just two actions,
satisfying (a) to (c), as \waterfall games": the lithograph \Waterfall" by the Dutch graphic
artist Maurits C. Escher, well-known for his illustrations involving impossible gures, depicts a
situation with water seemingly 
owing down all the way, yet ending up higher than before.
Notice that we stay as close as possible to Nash's (1951) traditional framework: players have
nitely many pure strategies and evaluate outcomes of mixed strategies using a (bounded) von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The treatment of the other possibility results in Section
3 follows the same structure: (i) a claim is stated, (ii) it is shown to be impossible in nite
games, but (iii) possible in innite ones. Leaving precise statements to Section 3, the remainder
of the introduction will provide an informal discussion of the possibility results and brie
y allude
to practical applications.
In Claim 1, everybody is better o if no-one chooses the dominant strategy than if everyone
does: better o, but not content, since the prole where everyone plays a dominated action is
not an equilibrium. The second claim makes the tension between dominant-strategy equilibria
and payo dominance in coordination games even more extreme:
Claim 2. There are coordination games where the best outcome occurs if every-
one chooses a weakly dominated action, while the worst outcome occurs if everyone
chooses the weakly dominant action.
In other words, although choosing a dominant action may seem a bright idea at rst sight, it may
have disastrous consequences, and everybody is best o by sticking to a dominated option. For
the same reason as before, this is impossible in nite coordination games. The idea is illustrated
in Figure 1: each step along the way either leaves you at the same height or one stair up the
stairway, but still you started at the highest point and ended up at the lowest. Claim 2 shows
3Figure 1: Good, better, ..., worst: an impossible stairway
that insisting on admissible actions (those that are not weakly dominated) as is common in
game theory (Luce and Raia, 1957, Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986) can be self-defeating.
Addictive substances provide a potential application. Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A., 1972, p.
7) encourages its members to forget about the past and to stay away from a drink \one day at
a time". This \one day at a time" slogan turns the life of an A.A.-member into a coordination
game with independent drink/abstain decisions by a sequence of agents (\A.A.-member at time
t 2 N") with identical preferences, the A.A.-member's utility. Call such a coordination game
an A.A.-game; see Subsection 5.1 for a more detailed discussion, including a comparison with
other models of addiction. Consumers of addictive substances may argue that, at any given
moment, using the substance weakly dominates not doing so: unless, for instance, their senses
are too numbed to notice any dierence, it makes them feel slightly better. Claim 2 indicates
that this temptation can be reconciled with the more politically correct view that abstinence
may be the best for your welfare and heavy addiction the worst.
Claim 3 is concerned with the location of payo-dominant equilibria. Two coordination
games that look so much alike that even the consequences of unilateral deviations are the same
may nevertheless have dierent payo-dominant equilibria:
Claim 3. There are pairs of virtually identical coordination games | only the two
4payo functions dier, yet the consequences of unilateral deviations are the same in
both games | with dierent payo-dominant equilibria.
For a potential application, consider a pair of A.A.-games, one for each of two distinct addictive
goods. Claim 3 indicates that even if, at any given time, the eect of just one more consumption
is the same for both commodities, there are benecial addictions (say, an acquired taste for art)
and opposite cases of harmful substances where total abstinence is well-advised.
Finally, even if one allows for mixed strategies, equilibrium existence is at stake:
Claim 4. There are coordination games without (pure or mixed) Nash equilibria.
The practical relevance is clear: much of economic analysis boils down to formulating a model
and studying its equilibria. Section 4 will show that Claim 4 is not just a mathematical curiosity:
there are simple assumptions on the payos under which games have no equilibria at all.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 recalls standard game-theoretic
denitions. Section 3 states Claims 2 to 4 more precisely and shows that they are impossible in
nite, but possible in innite games. The nonexistence of Nash equilibria is discussed in more
detail in Section 4. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
2. Game theoretic denitions
Our games remain as close as possible to those in Nash (1951): each player has nitely many
pure strategies/actions, may use mixed strategies (probability distributions over the pure strate-
gies) and evaluates outcomes using an integrable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
The only dierence is that games may have a countably innite set of players, for convenience
the set N of positive integers. We distinguish between these two classes of games by calling them
nite (if the set of players is nite) or innite (otherwise). Formally (Peleg, 1969), a game is
a tuple G = hN;(Ai)i2N;(ui)i2Ni. The set N is a nonempty, nite or countably innite, set of
players. Each player i 2 N has a nonempty, nite set Ai of pure strategies or actions. The set
of mixed strategies of player i 2 N is




The mixed-strategy space is denoted by  := i2N(Ai). Each i 2 (Ai) induces a probability
measure on the collection 2Ai of subsets of Ai in the usual way: for each E  Ai, i(E) =
P
ai2E i(ai). Let (A;AP) be the product measurable space i2N(Ai;2Ai). That is, AP is the
5product -algebra on the pure strategy space A := i2NAi generated by cylinders of the form
i2NEi with Ei  Ai for each i 2 N and Ei = Ai for all but nitely many i 2 N. Finally,
each player i 2 N has a real-valued, measurable payo/utility function ui on (A;AP), integrable
w.r.t. each product measure  2  on AP. The latter assumption is made to avoid `trivial'
paradoxical results due to unbounded expected payos. As usual, we do not distinguish between
a mixed strategy prole  = (i)i2N 2  and the product measure on AP induced by .
In a coordination game, all players have the same payo function: there is a function
U : A ! R such that ui = U for all i 2 N. An equilibrium of a coordination game is payo-
dominant if it maximizes the function U.
Let i 2 N and ai;bi 2 Ai. Action ai weakly dominates bi if
ui(ai;a i)  ui(bi;a i) for all a i 2 A i;
with strict inequality for some a i, and strictly dominates it if all inequalities are strict.
An action is weakly/strictly dominant if it weakly/strictly dominates all other actions. A
dominant-strategy equilibrium is one where each player chooses a (weakly/strictly) dominant
strategy.
3. Possibility results
In this section, Claims 2 to 4 from the introduction are stated in somewhat more detail.
The claims are shown to be false in nite games, but true in innite ones. Claim 2 shows that
the recommended course of action in terms of dominant strategies or payo-dominance may be
diametrically opposed, even if everybody gets the same payo:
Claim 2. There are games where
(a) there are no con
icts of interest: all players have the same payo function,
(b) each player has a weakly dominant pure strategy,
(c) nevertheless, the best thing that can happen to the players (a maximizer of the
utility function) occurs when everyone chooses a dominated strategy, whereas the
worst thing that can happen to the players (a minimizer of the utility function)
occurs when everyone chooses the dominant strategy.
Reasoning as in Claim 1, this is out of the question in nite coordination games. Start with
an arbitrary action prole and let players not already doing so switch to the dominant action,
6one at a time. Each switch weakly increases the common payo function, so the payo in the
dominant-strategy equilibrium is maximal. The next example | the mathematical equivalent
of Figure 1 | proves Claim 2.
Example 3.1 Each player i 2 N has two pure strategies, 0 and 1, and payo function







j2N aj is nite,
0 if
P
j2N(1   aj) is nite,
P
j2N aj  2 j otherwise.




j2N(1   aj) is nite and increases it by 2 i > 0 otherwise, action 1 weakly dominates action
0. However, U(0;0;:::) = 2 = maxa U(a) > mina U(a) = 0 = U(1;1;:::): /
According to Claim 3, coordination games that are so similar that even the consequences of
unilateral deviations are the same may nevertheless have dierent payo-dominant equilibria:
Claim 3. There are pairs of games, diering only in their payo functions, where
(a) there are no con
icts of interest: both games are coordination games,
(b) the consequences of unilateral deviations are identical in both games: if the
payo changes by some amount in one game, it changes by the same amount
in the other,
(c) their nonempty sets of payo-dominant equilibria are disjoint.
This is impossible in nite coordination games. There, the dierence between the payo
functions must be a constant, so the payo-dominant equilibria of the games coincide. To
see this, suppose the two games have n 2 N players and payo function U and V , respec-
tively. Consider two action proles a = (a1;:::;an) and b = (b1;:::;bn). We show that
U(a)   V (a) = U(b)   V (b). Start with a and let the rst player deviate to b1. The conse-
quences of unilateral deviations are required to be identical in both games:
U(a)   U(b1;a2;:::;an) = V (a)   V (b1;a2;:::;an);
or, after rearranging terms,
U(a)   V (a) = U(b1;a2;:::;an)   V (b1;a2;:::;an):
7Repeating this argument n times, each time letting the next player deviate unilaterally to his
action in b gives
U(a)   V (a) = U(b1;a2;:::;an)   V (b1;a2;:::;an)
= U(b1;b2;a3;:::;an)   V (b1;b2;a3;:::;an)
= 
= U(b)   V (b):
The next example proves Claim 3.
Example 3.2 Let c 2 R. Each player i 2 N has two pure strategies, 0 and 1, and payo







j2N aj  2 j if
P
j2N aj is nite,
P
j2N aj  2 j if
P
j2N aj is innite.
Given an arbitrary mixed-strategy prole, Kolmogorov's Zero-One Law (cf. Billingsley, 1995, p.
287, or Williams, 1991, p. 46) implies that the sum
P
j2N aj converges almost surely or diverges
almost surely. In the former case, each player's unique best reply is to choose action 0 with
probability one. In the latter case, each player's unique best reply is to choose action 1 with
probability one. Therefore, the game has two Nash equilibria, both in pure strategies: (0;0;:::)
and (1;1;:::). For each a 2 j2Nf0;1g,
Uc(a)  maxfU(0;0;:::);U(1;1;:::)g = maxfc;1g;
so (0;0;:::) is payo dominant if c > 1 and (1;1;:::) is payo dominant if c < 1: the location
of the payo-dominant equilibrium changes depending on c. The consequences of unilateral
deviations do not: for each player i 2 N and each action prole a i of his fellow players,






j2N aj is nite,
 2 i if
P
j2N aj is innite,
is independent of c. In other words, coordination games with payo function Uc for some c 2 R
are identical in terms of unilateral deviations and consequently have identical best-response
correspondences, but may have dierent payo-dominant equilibria. /
But life gets worse: there may be no equilibria at all.
8Claim 4. There are coordination games without (pure or mixed) Nash equilibria.
Of course, Nash's (1951) celebrated existence result rules this out in the nite setting. The next
example proves Claim 4.
Example 3.3 Each player i 2 N has two pure strategies, 0 and 1, and payo function






j2N aj  2 j if
P
j2N aj is nite,
 
P
j2N aj  2 j if
P
j2N aj is innite.
Consider an arbitrary mixed-strategy prole. By Kolmogorov's Zero-One Law,
P
j2N aj con-
verges almost surely or diverges almost surely. In the rst case, each player strictly prefers action
1. As the sum converges almost surely, there are players not choosing this unique best reply. In
the second case, each player strictly prefers action 0. As the sum diverges almost surely, there
are players not choosing this unique best reply. Hence, there is no Nash equilibrium. /
Section 4 shows that Claim 4 is not just a mathematical curiosity: there are simple assumptions
on the payos under which games have no equilibria at all.
4. Tail events and greener-grass games
What drives the previous results is that payos are dened in terms of whether or not
innitely many people choose a certain action. Such events are common in everyday issues:
\If we don't eventually stop using oil/shing for cod in the Baltic Sea/..., a catastrophe will
occur." Individual players and, by induction, an arbitrary nite number of players cannot aect
the occurrence of such events: if, for instance, only nitely many people choose a certain action,
nothing you | or for that matter, any nite number of players | can do, will make this
number innite. In the language of probability theory, events of this type are called tail events.
Subsection 4.1 provides preliminaries on tail events; see Billingsley (1995) or Williams (1991) for
further details. Subsection 4.2 shows that tail events easily give rise to games without (pure or
mixed) Nash equilibria. This is done by constructing, for each non-trivial tail event, a so-called
greener-grass game, following the English proverb that \the grass is always greener on the
other side of the hedge": if the tail event, say E, occurs (with probability one), players would
rather jump to a strategy prole outside of E, and vice versa.
94.1. Tail events
Let N be the player set. As each player i 2 N has a nite set Ai of actions, we can assume
w.l.o.g. that Ai is a nite subset of R; the examples use Ai = f0;1g. For each i 2 N, let
Xi : A ! R be the random variable specifying player i's action: Xi(a) = ai for each a 2 A. The
tail -algebra is the -algebra
AT := \1
i=1(fXj : j  ig);
where (fXj : j  ig) is the -algebra generated by the random variables Xi;Xi+1;::: An
event E 2 AT is a tail event. By denition, whether a tail event occurs is independent of
the realization of nitely many of the Xi's: only tails matter. As all Xi are measurable in the
product -algebra AP, it follows that AT  AP.
A convenient tool for tail events is Kolmogorov's Zero-One Law, already used in Examples
3.2 and 3.3: if a tail event is dened in terms of independent stochastic variables (and the players
choose their strategies independently), it occurs with probability zero or with probability one.
A sucient condition (Peleg, 1969) for the existence of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in
games as dened above is that payos are continuous in the product topology TP on the pure
strategy space. Endowing each Ai with the discrete topology 2Ai, the product topology TP is
the topology whose basis consists of the cylinders of the form i2NEi with Ei  Ai for each
i 2 N and Ei = Ai for all but nitely many i 2 N.
The product topology and the tail -algebra, however, have only trivial sets in common:
Proposition 4.1 A tail event E 2 AT, other than ; or the entire pure-strategy space A, is
neither open nor closed in the product topology.
Proof. Let E 2 AT nf;;Ag. Suppose E is closed, i.e., its complement Ec is open: Ec 2 TP. Let
x 2 E;y 2 Ec. This is possible, as E = 2 f;;Ag. Construct a sequence (sn)n2N in A as follows.
For each n 2 N, the strategy prole sn = (sn1;sn2;:::) has coordinates snk = yk if k  n and
snk = xk if k > n. That is, sn is obtained from x by exchanging its rst n coordinates by those
of y. Then limn!1 sn = y 2 Ec. However, as x lies in the tail event E, and each sn diers from
x only in the rst n coordinates, also sn 2 E. As (sn)n2N is a convergent sequence in the closed
set E, its limit y must lie in E as well. Contradiction.
Next, suppose E is open, i.e., Ec is closed. By denition of a -algebra, also Ec 2 AT. By
the previous step, no such closed set exists. 
10Consequently, payo functions dened in terms of tail events are typically not continuous in the
product topology. This violation of Peleg's (1969) sucient condition for equilibrium existence
is exploited in Proposition 4.2 to provide a simple construction of a large class of games without
Nash equilibria.
4.2. Greener-grass games
As the saying goes, the grass is always greener on the other side of the hedge. This dissat-
isfaction, no matter what happens, is the intuition behind our greener-grass games. Given
some tail event E, other than ; or the entire pure-strategy space A, we construct a game GE
without Nash equilibria by making sure that if the tail event E occurs (with probability one),
the players would rather jump to a strategy prole in its complement Ec, and vice versa.
Proposition 4.2 For each i 2 N, let Ai  R be a nite set of (at least two) pure strate-
gies. Let E 2 AT be a tail event, E = 2 f;;Ag. Then there is a greener-grass game GE =
hN;(Ai)i2N;(ui)i2Ni without (pure or mixed) Nash equilibria.





1 if (a 2 E and ai = yi) or (a 2 Ec and ai = xi),
0 otherwise.
(1)
The game GE = hN;(Ai)i2N;(ui)i2Ni has no Nash equilibria. Indeed, given an arbitrary mixed-
strategy prole, Kolmogorov's Zero-One Law implies that the tail event E either occurs with
probability one or with probability zero. Hence, each player i 2 N has a unique best reply: pure
strategy yi in the rst case and pure strategy xi in the second. So a Nash equilibrium must be
in pure strategies. But pure Nash equilibria do not exist. Suppose a 2 A is a Nash equilib-
rium. If a 2 E, the unique best reply of each i 2 N is yi: ai = yi for all i 2 N, i.e., a = y = 2 E,
a contradiction. Similarly, if a 2 Ec, then ai = xi for all i 2 N, i.e., a = x 2 E, a contradiction. 
A possible reaction to the nonexistence of Nash equilibria is that one may not be able to make
everybody content, but that there may be approximate equilibria (Radner, 1980), where players
get a payo pretty close to that of a best response. Consider, for instance, Example 3.3. Let
" > 0. An approximate or "-equilibrium is a strategy prole in which players cannot gain
more than " from unilateral deviation. As the eect, in absolute value, of a unilateral deviation
by an arbitrary player j is at most 2 j, players j 2 N with 2 j < " automatically receive a
11payo that is at most " away from their best response. Assign to these players an arbitrary
mixed strategy. The reduced game between the players j with 2 j  " has only nitely many
players and therefore a Nash equilibrium. Combining this with the previously xed strategies
of players with a large index gives an "-equilibrium of the game.
However, the payos in the examples were chosen for mathematical convenience only. It is
not dicult to construct games where even approximate equilibria do not exist:
Example 4.3 Each player i 2 N has two pure strategies, 0 and 1, and payo function







k > 1=2 and ai = 0)
or (limsupk!1
a1++ak
k  1=2 and ai = 1),
0 otherwise.
Let " 2 (0;1=2) and let  2  be a mixed-strategy prole. By Kolmogorov's Zero-One Law, the
tail event fa 2 A : limsupk!1
a1++ak
k > 1=2g occurs with probability zero or one. In the rst
case, choosing action 0 gives payo 0 and action 1 gives payo 1, so if  is an "-equilibrium, each
player chooses action 1 with probability at least 1 " > 1=2. This contradicts that the tail event
occurs with probability zero. Similarly, in the second case, choosing action 0 gives payo 1 and
action 1 gives payo 0, so if  is an "-equilibrium, each player chooses action 1 with probability
at most " < 1=2. This contradicts that the tail event occurs with probability one. Hence, there
is no "-equilibrium, let alone a Nash equilibrium. /
As an aside, Hart and Schmeidler (1989, Example 2) show that correlated equilibria need not
exist either.
5. Concluding remarks
5.1. A.A.-games and other models of addiction
Suppose a decision-maker has to decide at each moment in discrete time whether to take a
drink (action 1) or not (action 0). Given the person's uncertain life-length, common modeling
practice is to treat such problems as having an innite horizon, properly discounting conse-
quences of future actions. This makes the decision-maker's utility function U : j2Nf0;1g ! R
of the additively separable type used in the examples in Sections 1 and 3; discounting by powers
of 1=2 was for mathematical convenience only.
12The philosophy of Alcoholics Anonymous is to deal with the temptations of alcohol by treat-
ing each decision independently, \one day at a time". Thus, one can model these independent
decisions as taken by a sequence of agents representing the A.A.-member at dierent times
t 2 N, all with his best interests, measured by his utility function U, in mind. This results in
the A.A.-games from the introduction: coordination games with a countably innite player set
as a model of a single decision-maker with an uncertain life-span making a series of independent
choices in discrete time.
A.A.-games dier from existing models of addiction in a number of ways. Firstly, those
following the work of Becker and Murphy (1988) model consumption of addictive goods as
a single decision, maximizing life-time utility. Secondly, those that do use a multiple-selves
approach often rely on the work of Strotz (1955) with preferences changing over time due to
hyperbolic discounting. Our games illustrate that there is room for counterintuitive results like
Claim 2 already in the context of constant preferences.
The model of Basu (2000, Chapter 3) is a symbiosis: he sometimes speaks of act-optimizing
behavior by independent agents (our A.A.-game), sometimes of rule-optimizing behavior by a
single agent (life-time utility maximization).
5.2. Other motivations for countable player sets
For completeness, we summarize some other standard motivations for using countably innite
player sets. Firstly, if we consider all past, current, and future generations, the number of
people may well be innite (Basu, 1994). Secondly, the framework with a countably innite
number of players facilitates modeling situations where the population is large, but the role
of individual players cannot be ignored. In contrast, in the standard nonatomic model, the
player set is the unit interval [0;1] endowed with its usual Lebesgue measure, and individuals
(having measure zero) are insignicant. Thirdly, authors like Myerson (1998) and Milchtaich
(2004) model interaction under population uncertainty. Examples include Internet auctions,
large elections, and trac congestion. They argue that even if you are convinced that the
number of fellow players is nite, you may not know an upper bound, i.e., you may never be
quite sure that there isn't just one more player in the game. In such cases, the underlying set
of players is appropriately modeled as innite. This is analogous to the motivation that some
repeated games, even if they objectively speaking end after a nite number of rounds, are most
appropriately modeled as innitely repeated games. Such an innite horizon is appropriate if
players, after each round, believe | possibly erroneously | that there may be an additional
13round. Fourthly, one commonly denes equilibria of games with incomplete information as Nash
equilibria of a strategic game where players are identied by their `name' and their type. Hence,
even if the number of players of a Bayesian game is nite, allowing for a countably innite
state/type space introduces an innite number of players in the associated strategic game.
5.3. Greener-grass games are potential games
The construction of greener-grass games in the proof of Proposition 4.2 gives players dierent
payo functions. We can restrict attention to coordination games: the next result shows that
players act as if they all have the same payo function. In terms of Monderer and Shapley
(1996), greener-grass games are ordinal potential games.
Proposition 5.1 Each greener-grass game GE = hN;(Ai)i2N;(ui)i2Ni constructed in Proposi-
tion 4.2 is an ordinal potential game: the function U : A ! R with U =
P
j2N 2 juj is such
that for all i 2 N, all a i 2 A i, and all ai;bi 2 Ai:
ui(ai;a i)   ui(bi;a i) > 0 , U(ai;a i)   U(bi;a i) > 0: (2)
Also the coordination game hN;(Ai)i2N;(U)i2Ni has an empty set of Nash equilibria.
Proof. Let i 2 N, a i 2 A i, and ai;bi 2 Ai. By denition, tail events do not depend on
single coordinates: (ai;a i) 2 E if and only if (bi;a i) 2 E. Substitution in (1) gives that
uj(ai;a i) = uj(bi;a i) for all j 2 N n fig. By denition of U:




= 2 i[ui(ai;a i)   ui(bi;a i)] > 0
, ui(ai;a i)   ui(bi;a i) > 0:
The game hN;(Ai)i2N;(U)i2Ni has no Nash equilibria: reasoning as in the proof of Proposition
4.2, Kolmogorov's Zero-One Law allows us to restrict attention to pure Nash equilibria. By (2),
these must be pure Nash equilibria of the greener-grass game GE, which has none. 
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